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Abstract. Acknowledging the FAA’s well-known PEAR model, and the
influence of the dirty dozen in aviation maintenance, the authors examine a
tracking and reporting system that fulﬁlls FAA requirements for safety management systems in aviation maintenance organizations. Implications and suggestions for a robust safety management system which encompasses human
factors and ORM, applicable to an aviation maintenance environment are presented, with the inclusion of speciﬁc risk hazards. The resulting safety reporting
system proposed addresses both consistency and reliability challenges, unique to
the aviation maintenance environment. Using the four pillars of safety as a
foundation, the REPAIRER strategy procedures serves as the safety policy
pillar, through the examination and rating of potential risk hazards, based on the
dirty dozen. The resulting reporting system leverages aviation maintenancespeciﬁc factors to identify and correct for human errors, improving the reliability
of maintenance procedures, enhancing safety practices, and ultimately creating a
greater state of operational readiness.
Keywords: Aviation maintenance  Human factors
Operational risk management  Safety management system

1 Introduction
Human error can be traced to approximately 80% of major Federal Aviation Regulation
(FAR) 121 Category aviation accidents in the United States. Of that 80%, up to 10%
are caused by human error in aviation maintenance, which is accompanied with a 6.5
times greater chance for disaster [1]. As a result, the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) is keen on reducing the percentage of accidents caused by human errors related
to aviation maintenance. This motivation is further fueled by the projected growth of
the aviation industry in the US over the next 25 years. With growth comes additional
aircraft, and subsequently the maintenance that will be needed to keep them in the sky.
With an increase in maintenance, comes a higher chance for human error within the
aviation maintenance environment; while the percentage may stay the same, the pool
from which that number is derived, is much larger. The FAA’s current strategy to
reduce the prevalence of human error in aviation maintenance for FAR 121 operations
comes in the form of an internationally acclaimed safety system initiated over the past
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decade by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO); Safety Management
Systems (SMS). Although many elements of SMS have been used for decades, overall,
it presents a model which identiﬁes certain elements that are mandatory and essential
for a successful safety program. These elements are shown in Fig. 1. [2] and represent
the 4 supporting legs of the SMS table; Risk Management, Safety Assurance, Safety
Policy and Safety Promotion. The SMS table top illustrates the fact that all elements
must work together.

Fig. 1. The SMS Table [2]

SMS Elements. In Fig. 1, the top view of the SMS table can be clearly seen, with the
basic requirements for each of the 4 table legs. The upper left corner highlights the
important components of the Safety Policy leg via formal procedures, along with how
the organization chooses to enforce such procedures. In aviation maintenance, a clear
set of safety procedures would be required, along with identiﬁed organizational
authorities to support the enforcement of safety responsibilities. The upper right corner
features the Safety Assurance leg, which emphasizes the handling and tracking of
hazards and corrective actions. This also includes having a reporting system to manage
and track audits. For the Safety Assurance leg to be successful in an aviation maintenance environment, the anonymity of reporters would be essential. The lower left
hand corner, Safety Promotion, represents how the maintenance organization will carry
out the SMS system through the development of a safety culture, which in maintenance, would stem from open communication and training. The Risk Management leg
in the lower right-hand corner illustrates the importance of risk management via the
three required steps of; Hazard Identiﬁcation, Risk Assessment and Risk Mitigation.
The FAA Mandates SMS in All FAR 121 Operations by March, 2018. Given the
fact that the 4 SMS elements work so well together, the FAA has now mandated the use
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of SMS for all FAR 121 Operators in the United States by March, 2018. This includes
FAR 121 maintenance operations that maintain those FAR 121 Operators’ aircraft. The
use of SMS by FAR 121 Operators can only enhance the safety, however, the overall
effect on aviation maintenance operations will remain to be seen. Despite the success of
SMS, there are potential issues that could hinder its implementation into aviation
maintenance; culture, cost, and practical application. A shift in the safety culture poses
signiﬁcant challenges. The fast pace and unique stressors found in this environment
make the implementation of any change difﬁcult. Maintenance is a continuous process.
Additionally, the inclusion of a new process will not come without the burden of
training, design and implementation costs. The third obstacle would be to ensure all the
legs of the SMS Table are carried out as intended. In large FAR 121 aviation maintenance organizations, the concern would be doing the four SMS table legs correctly
and then ensuring they are being carried out on a day to day basis. For smaller FAR
121 maintenance operations, and eventually even smaller FAR 135 aviation maintenance operations, attempting to execute the 4 table legs of the SMS without the burden
of excessive work, cost, and effort will be difﬁcult. A solution to this issue would be to
streamline the process and tailor the four SMS legs to ﬁt the realistic needs of that
aviation maintenance organization. The FAA is currently promoting this tailoring
philosophy through their SMS training program as a way to address implementation
issues. Tailoring the four legs would also allow aviation maintenance organizations to
place additional emphasis on human factors, thus mitigating human error and reducing
the prevalence of aviation maintenance related accidents.
The SMS Program is Centered Around Risk Management Not Human Factors.
One problem with implementing SMS into aviation maintenance operations is the
unavoidable risk of human error. Although the SMS is centered on a strong Risk
Management Program, it is not the best tool when used independently to analyze and
then address the speciﬁc human factors that contribute to human error. A closer look at
Fig. 1. reveals that the most important leg of the SMS table is the ‘Safety Risk
Management’ leg. As such, it is in the principles of modern risk management that the
SMS program was founded on. Within this model is a well-tested, safety process that
monitors and contributes to safety, as evidenced by its global use and endorsements by
ICAO and the FAA. The Risk Management Process is clearly an effective approach to
managing risk. It has proven itself successful over the past 40 years by NASA and the
United States military aviation community. In the last 20 years, the entire United States
Department of Defense has adopted it. The Risk Management Process consists of 5
important steps as follows: Identify the Hazard, Assess the Risk related to the Hazard,
Create a Mitigation Strategy, Implement that Strategy and Assess and Evaluate the
process to make changes of improvement.
SMS and Risk Management. At the heart of using the Risk Management Process is
the simpliﬁed Risk Assessment Matrix. One of the biggest reasons for the success of
the Risk Management Process is its ability to identify a hazard and take it through a
successful mitigation process, which has been proven it its nearly 40 year track record.
Even more important is the fact that within the process it has the ability to rate the
hazard, through accurate probability, on its level of danger over time, through a
standardized scale. It has become a tool for managers to critically analyze hazards,
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identify which of those are most critical and must be addressed immediately, and those
that can be dealt with at a later time. The other advantage of the hazard rating system is
that it can be used operationally, on the spot. As a hazard is identiﬁed, it can then be
quickly analyzed through a standardized matrix, similar to the one used by the United
States Marine Corps in Fig. 2 [3]. By using the Risk Assessment Matrix, any individual
in an operational organization can quickly rate the severity of a hazard, the probability
of it occurring, and then calculate the hazard’s risk assessment. By having the risk level
analyzed, it allows managers or other personnel to assess the severity of the risk and
determine an appropriate course of action.

Fig. 2. Risk assessment management matrix [3]

Human Factors to Analyze Human Error is also Needed in Maintenance.
Although the Risk Management process has proven effective at identifying and
assessing hazards which pose risks, many aviation maintenance hazards are due to
human factors, which ultimately result with errors in maintenance. Additionally, many
of these errors are not found in isolation; they are multiple human factors, when linked
together result with human error, ultimately working against safe maintenance practices. Numerous research studies have uncovered human error trends in aviation
maintenance by examining years of accident investigation data related to aviation
maintenance in FAR 121 Operations. According to Rankin [4], the breakdown of these
accidents is 20% mechanical failure and 80% human error (to include: aircrew, air
trafﬁc control and maintenance personnel). Additionally, Graeber and Marx [5] indicate
that human error has led to improper aviation maintenance, contributing to 12% of
major aircraft accidents (for FAR 121 Operations) and 50% of propulsion system
malfunctions that ultimately resulted in flight postponements and terminations. While
12% may not seem signiﬁcant, for aviation maintenance operations, this percentage is
alarming. The potential for human error in maintenance to directly contribute to an
aviation accident, including loss of human life along and the destruction of an aircraft,
is evident. Accidents such as these come with a tremendous price tag; a maintenance
malpractice suit could easily bankrupt a major carrier. Commercial flight operations in
the United States have been operating at the highest levels of safety in the past decade,
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however, a flurry aviation maintenance mistakes, or substantial increase in the demand
for air travel, could quickly change that. According to Hobbs [6], human error in
aircraft maintenance not only presents a dangerous hazard to flight safety, but it has the
potential to generate signiﬁcant ﬁnancial costs related to flight postponements, terminations, alterations, and other schedule interruptions.
Identifying the Human Factors that Contribute to Human Error. The issue with
human error in aviation maintenance is not that these dangers are not known or that the
industry does not want to eradicate this danger from commercial flight. Instead, the
problem is how to identify and control the myriad of human factors issues in maintenance, many of which tend to combine together, as if part of the procedure. When this
occurs, the chain of errors which results can be disastrous. Aircrew and air trafﬁc
control research has helped drive major improvements in the flight process. Technological innovations have made considerable aviation safety improvements, resulting in
a reduction of human error and a 40% reduction in aircrew related accidents between
1983 and 2002 [7]. Over the last 30 years, such successful processes like Advanced
Crew Resource Management and technology improvements like Ground Proximity
Warning System (GPWS), Terrain Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) and Onboard
Weather Radar, have vastly reduced human error in the United States in the aircrew and
controller environment. But what can be done to likewise reduce human error in
maintenance?
Understanding Human Error in Aviation Maintenance through Human Factors
Research. Looking closer at the research, human error in aviation maintenance tells of
a complex story with no easy solutions. Critical evidence from research investigations
performed in aviation maintenance found that 34% of regular maintenance tasks were
performed incorrectly [8]. Further analysis shows that 38% of human error in aviation
maintenance was related to aviation maintenance technical manuals that were used to
perform maintenance procedures [9]. In the same study, the researchers were able to
break the 38% procedural error from technical manuals down to: omitted information
(48%), improper information (19%), difﬁculty interpreting data (19%), and inconsistent
information (14%). The investigation also noted that 28% of the error resulted from the
inability of aircraft maintainers to read, understand, or follow the technical manual
appropriately. Graeber and Marx [10] noted that a signiﬁcant number FAR 121
Operations accidents were caused by maintenance and concluded that these types of
accidents were also categorized in causation by: omissions (56%), inadequate installations (30%), and incorrect parts (8%).
Human Factors that Influence Human Error in Aviation Maintenance. After
reviewing much of the research on aviation maintenance-related accidents, it is clear
that much of the human error is rooted in the conduct of maintenance itself; the
technician either does the task correctly or incorrectly. This begs the question, why is
this occurring? Marais and Robichaud [1] have found the environment surrounding
maintenance procedures plays a crucial role in causing maintenance errors. Much of
this is due to the fact that 90% of maintenance inspection procedures are visual, and
often involve a critical sequence of procedures, which must be followed exactly. The
investigation found that if aviation maintenance technicians (AMTs) were not provided
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the appropriate conditions (such as proper lighting), numerous defects in the maintenance process may be missed, resulting in human error and compromised safety. Other
research completed by Transport Canada found similar environmental conditions, as
well as other contributing factors, which could cause an aviation maintainer to err in
their task. During the 1980’s, Transport Canada did a great deal of research on human
error in aviation maintenance, which ultimately resulted in the formation of the ‘Dirty
Dozen’, the twelve most common contributing human factors that influence human
error and contribute to aviation maintenance accidents.

Fig. 3. The dirty dozen and 40,000 ways to make an aircraft maintenance error [11].

Effects of Human Factors like the Dirty Dozen on Aviation Maintenance Human
Error. The illustration in Fig. 3 shows the Dirty Dozen next to a bolt with several nuts
on it [11]. It represents an aviation maintenance procedure, making the point that there
is only one way to procedurally take the bolts off the nut (one by one). Putting the nuts
back on, however, could be done in 40,000 different ways. Each of the nuts could be
associated with one of the Dirty Dozen. For example, the nuts should procedurally go
back on the bolt in order from A-H, but due to lack of communication, nut A was set
aside and nut B was placed on ﬁrst. Due to lack of teamwork, as the maintainer was
working alone, nut B was not placed perfectly to the top of the bolt. Due to lack of
assertiveness the oncoming maintainer in the new shift placed nut C behind nut B even
though he could see that nut B was possibly not perfectly flush, but was conﬁdent that
with nut C tight behind it, there would be no problem. As this maintenance procedure
continues through the completion of nut H, the human factors associated with the event
are compounding, thus increasing the possibility of a human error, and potentially an
aviation mishap. The point of the lesson is that any of the Dirty Dozen, along with
many other human factors variables, can interfere with aviation maintenance personnel
while working, causing any number of maintenance procedures to be completed
incorrectly.
The PEAR Method of Human Factors Analysis for Aviation Maintenance. To
help recognize the danger of potential human factors variables which can contribute to
or cause dangerous levels of miscues in aviation maintenance, the FAA devised a
maintenance human factors analysis method, in the form of an acronym called the
PEAR method [12]. The “P” in the PEAR Model stands for people and all the possible
human factors that can affect people, including physiological, psychological, and
ergonomic factors that maintainers encounter in their daily tasks. The “E” in the PEAR
Model stands for the environment that surrounds the maintainer. The environment
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includes elements such as temperature and humidity, the amount of light available, the
air that is being breathed and noise. Other factors such as pressure to complete a task by
a manager is also considered environmental, as is fatigue encountered during the night
shift. The “A” in the PEAR model stands for the actions that the maintainer did or did
not perform during the conduct of maintenance. Actions become important during the
analysis phase given that they relate directly to procedural human error, which has been
identiﬁed as the leading cause of maintenance aviation accidents. The last letter in the
PEAR Model is “R”, which stands for maintenance resources. Was proper maintenance
equipment and/or tools utilized to complete the task? Most importantly, were the
proper parts distributed for the assigned task? Each of the PEAR letters are important
because they truly identify relevant human factors which can be linked to human error
in maintenance. The issue, however, with the PEAR method, is that it does not optimally address human error. Should the PEAR be used after an accident or incident
occurs or should it be used strongly in a prevention role as well? The new SMS system
is based on a proactive and preventative safety stance. Perhaps now is the time to
introduce a new model for human factors in maintenance using the SMS principles to
proactively prevent human error in maintenance by including a form of the PEAR
method within an SMS program?
The REPAIRER Reporting System. Such a model would seem difﬁcult to design
and achieve. However, if the foundation of the design is centered on streamlining and
tailoring the SMS model for aviation maintenance purposes so that it can be used
efﬁciently, a new model is feasible. By combining human factors and risk management
to an SMS reporting system, both safety and efﬁciency can be achieved. Utilizing an
existing acronym already familiar to maintenance personnel (PEAR), the REPAIRER
reporting system is an appropriate place to begin [13].
The First “R” is all about Rating and Reporting a Hazard. The ﬁrst “R” in the
REPAIRER model stands for rating and reporting a hazard. In this ﬁrst step, two
critical elements of the SMS are immediately incorporated. A hazard is identiﬁed, rated
and will be anonymously reported by anyone in the maintenance organization. The
identiﬁcation of a hazard and rating it are foundational SMS Risk Management steps,
which can be found in the SMS Risk Management table leg. After the hazard is
identiﬁed, utilizing a Risk Management Matrix can help managers to quickly assess
how dangerous a potential hazard is by giving it a risk assessment value. Hazards with
the highest risk assessment ratings should be given priority, as opposed to those with
lower risk assessment ratings. Reporting the hazard is another SMS foundational step
required under the Safety Assurance table leg. In essence, REPAIRER is ﬁrst and
foremost a reporting system to improve safety and gain opportunities for efﬁciency in a
maintenance organization.
The ‘EPAIR’ in REPAIRER Becomes the Human Factors Analysis of the
Hazard. Unlike other SMS reporting systems that simply identify and rate a hazard,
REPAIRER requires human factors data to be reported, and is represented in the
‘EPAIR’ of the REPAIRER acronym. This is the opportunity for ideas found in the
original PEAR method to be used in the SMS format, as a human factors analysis
maintenance tool. The ‘EPAIR’ has now become a modiﬁed PEAR model within the
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REPAIRER system to analyze potential human factors related to the hazard. The “E”
stands for the environment that the hazard occurs in. Details of the environment need to
be supplied by the person ﬁlling out the REPAIRER report. This includes a physical
overview of the environment such as lighting and temperature, but also what was
occurring within the organizational environment during the time of the hazard. The “P”
stands for the people involved. This includes deﬁcient qualiﬁcations and any training
required to conduct the task. Additionally, any physical, physiological or psychological
issues deemed relevant should be included in the report as well. The “A” in the
REPAIRER method stands for the actions of the people involved. Because maintenance research points toward procedural problems, in terms of human error in causing
maintenance accidents, it is important to identify what the people involved with the
hazard did or did not do at this juncture. The “I” in the REPAIRER method stands for
the investigation of the proper procedures associated with conducting the maintenance
action, noting any shortfalls, as implied or found during the “A” step. This step is
critical; it is imperative to know exactly how the incorrect maintenance action was
performed, but also how it should have been done correctly. Additionally, there is a
chance that the current procedure is either unsafe or inefﬁcient, and therefore must be
amended. The next letter in the REPAIRER model is the second “R” for the resources
that were required to do the job. If the resources required to complete the maintenance
task were inadequate in any way, they need to be reported here.
Creating a Mitigation Strategy and Reevaluating it. Once the Hazard has been
identiﬁed, rated, and analyzed for potential human factors, it then becomes important to
complete the next task; the recommended solution using the human factors analysis.
With a recommendation in place, it must be continually reevaluated to ensure both
safety and efﬁciency are achieved. Both are critical steps in completing the SMS
requirement, given that the mitigation strategy falls under the Risk Management table
leg. The reevaluation falls under the Safety Assurance leg. The second “E” in the
REPAIRER model is associated with executing mitigation strategies for the identiﬁed
hazard. At a minimum, the person or persons ﬁlling out the report need to make a
recommendation. By doing so, the person reporting the hazard will have an incentive to
do so, as they will feel part of the solution. The last letter of the REPAIRER model is
the third “R” which stands for reevaluating the mitigation strategies after a period of
time, to ensure they are working. Whether the mitigation strategy was created by the
person generating the report or by others within the organization, it can never be taken
for granted that the mitigation strategy is working in the maintenance environment. The
ﬁnal “R” of reevaluation requires some form of an audit or inspection to reassess the
signiﬁcance of the hazard, once the mitigation strategy is in place. If the mitigation
strategy is working, no further action is needed. However, if the mitigation strategy
needs to be changed or adjusted, this is the opportunity to do so. Once the strategy has
been reevaluated, and is deemed completed, no further action is needed. The proper
completion of the last “R” is paramount to concluding the REPAIRER process.
Application. With the REPAIRER Reporting System created, it is now essential to
implement this system in an effort to determine the extent to which safety and efﬁciency in an aviation maintenance environment could be improved. First, the policy
pillar of SMS would be addressed through the identiﬁcation of the REPAIRER
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procedures. This would be supported via a departmental authority, such as the Quality
Assurance Manager or the Director of Maintenance. Both of these positions provide the
appropriate resources as well as authority measures to clearly identify safety policy
procedures. Included in the policy would be methods for anonymous reporting. This is
an essential component in the successful implementation of the REPAIRER reporting
system; for doing so would allow employees at all levels in the organization to report a
potential safety hazard, without risk of retribution. One way this could be accomplished
would be via a mobile reporting app, many of which are conﬁdential and anonymous;
however, the REPAIRER system allows the freedom for organizational authorities to
make such decisions as appropriate and ﬁscally feasible.
After the procedures are written, the SMS Promotion table leg would then need to
be addressed. As with any SMS, in order for the policy leg to be supported, it needs
adequate support from leadership. The end-state goal would be to create a culture of
safety and open reporting, which is founded on the REPAIRER strategy. Given that the
strategy is rooted in SMS policies and procedures, which most aviation maintenance
organizations currently have in place, minimal training would be needed. After
reviewing current safety policies, gaps could be identiﬁed between current procedures
and the REPAIRER method. Once identiﬁed, short videos which explained the new,
additional steps could be constructed. The videos would be 2–3 min in length and
include employees from all levels of the organization. The videos could be accessed
through mobile devices, which would have minimal impacts on workload. Each step
could be completed separately, over the course of a week or two. At the end of the
training period, a summary video would review the pertinent steps of the REPAIRER
method, given again by someone in the organization that employees could relate to.
However, this could not be completed without buy-in from leadership at every level in
the organization. All managers and supervisors must relate the value created by the
REPAIRER strategy to those that must enforce it on a daily basis. This could be done
visually or virtually via white boards in the hangar or on the organization’s website. In
doing so, the technicians could see and track how their daily decisions impact overall
safety, the number of accidents, and the ﬁscal repercussions that result.
Once these last two legs of the SMS table are in place, it would then be of utmost
importance to test the REPAIRER Reporting System to determine the extent to which
this system enhanced safety and efﬁciency, while maintaining ﬁscal constraints. An
optimal organization for which the REPAIRER Reporting System to be tested would
be small to medium sized aviation maintenance organizations which operated under
FAA Part 121 authority.
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